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In recent years the Supreme Court has decided a spate of cases
about the compelled subsidization of speech.' All have involved
federal statutes creating industry boards empowered to tax pro-
ducers of specific agricultural products in order to promote and
stabilize the market in those products. Some of these statutes were
enacted during the New Deal era,2 whereas others are quite recent.3
In the past decade these statutes have been challenged on the ground
that they compel producers to subsidize objectionable commercial
advertisements. The resulting cases have raised conceptually diffi-
cult and complex First Amendment questions, which the Court has
proved unable to master.
At first, in Glickman v Wileman Bros. & Elliott,4 the Court upheld
a federal marketing program for California summer fruits that re-
quired private parties to subsidize an advertising campaign. Dis-
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missing claims that this mandated subsidization amounted to com-
pelled speech in violation of the First Amendment, the Court in a
narrow five-to-four opinion held that "our compelled speech case
law . ..is clearly inapplicable to the regulatory scheme at issue
here."' Four years later the Court reversed course, and in United
States v United Foods, Inc.6 struck down a program designed to pro-
mote and stabilize the market in fresh mushrooms. The opinion,
joined by six Justices, announced that "First Amendment concerns
apply" whenever the state requires persons to "subsidize speech with
which they disagree."7
The Court's opinion in United Foods sparked a cascade of lower-
court decisions that rapidly developed what may be called compelled
subsidization of speech doctrine,8 which in the remainder of this
article I shall refer to as "CSSD." United Foods set forth the basic
premise of CSSD: First Amendment scrutiny is triggered whenever
someone is forced to pay for speech that she finds objectionable.
Because taxation involves the compelled subsidization of govern-
ment speech, an obvious difficulty with this premise is that it seems
to imply that constitutional scrutiny is required every time a tax-
payer disagrees with government messages supported by her tax
dollars. This is plainly an untenable position, yet the seemingly
inexorable pressure of CSSD led the Eighth Circuit in Livestock
Marketing Ass'n v Department of Agriculture' to conclude that "a
determination that the expression at issue is government speech
Id at 470.
6533 US 405 (2001).
7 Id at 410-11. An important question, which I shall not discuss in this article, is whether
and how compelled speech doctrine ought to apply to the kind of commercial speech that
is at issue in these cases. See note 117 below.
8 See, e.g., Pelts & Skins, LLC v Landreneau, 365 F3d 423 (5th Cir 2004) (Louisiana
Alligator Resource Fund), vacated, 125 S Ct 2511 (2005); Cochran v Veneman, 359 F3d
263 (3d Cir 2004) (Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983), vacated sub nom, Lovell
v Cochran, 125 S Ct 2511 (2005), and Johanns v Cochran, 125 S Ct 2512 (2005); Mich.
Pork Producers Ass'n v Veneman, 348 F3d 157 (6th Cir 2003) (Pork Promotion, Research
and Consumer Information Act), vacated sub nom, Mich. Pork ProducerAss'n v Campaign
for Family Farms, 125 S Ct 2511 (2005), and Johanns v Campaign for Family Farms, 125
S Ct 2511 (2005); Delano Farms Co. v Cal. Table Grape Comm'n, 318 F3d 895 (9th Cir
2003) (California Table Grape Commission); In re Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 257
F Supp 2d 1290 (ED Wash 2003) (Washington State Apple Commission); Charter v U.S.
Dep't ofAgr., 230 F Supp 2d 1121 (D Mont 2002), vacated, 412 F3d 1017 (9th Cir 2005);
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v Kawamura, 90 P3d 1179 (Cal 2004); Dep't of Citrus v Graves Bros.
Co., 889 So2d 831 (Fla Dist Ct App 2004).
9 335 F3d 711 (8th Cir 2003), vacated sub nom, Johanns v Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S
Ct 2055 (2005).
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does not preclude First Amendment scrutiny in the compelled
speech context.''
The Supreme Court acted swiftly to check this radical implication
of its own doctrine. Last Term in Johanns v Livestock Marketing
Ass'n" it reversed the Eighth Circuit to hold "that compelled fund-
ing of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment
concerns."' 2 Although Johanns is quite definite that citizens "have
no First Amendment right not to fund government speech," 3 it
never offers a theoretical account of why taxation is an exception
to the basic premise of CSSD. Johanns instead stresses the practical
point that "it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government
will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend
its own policies."' 4 The exemption accorded byJohanns to govern-
ment speech is thus a blunt ipse dixit; it does not prompt the Court
to reconsider the basic framework of CSSD.
This is unfortunate, for CSSD's failure to explain why taxation
should not prompt constitutional scrutiny is merely the surface
manifestation of deep conceptual insufficiencies. Indeed, I shall ar-
gue in this article that the fundamental premise of CSSD is flawed,
and that the premise has accordingly generated a dangerously un-
stable doctrinal structure which Johanns patched but did not repair.
It is simply not true that First Amendment concerns are implicated
whenever persons are required to subsidize speech with which they
disagree. My thesis is that CSSD cannot be rebuilt along theoret-
ically defensible lines until we have some better explanation of when
0 Livestock Mktg., 335 F3d at 723 n 9. The court explained, "appellees in the present
case are challenging the government's authority to compel them to support speech with
which they personally disagree; such compulsion is a form of 'government interference
with private speech.' The two categories of First Amendment cases-government speech
cases and compelled speech cases-are fundamentally different." Id at 720.
"125 S Ct 2055 (2005).
12 Id at 2062.
'3 Id at 2063.
"4 Id at 2062 (quoting Bd. of Regents v Southworth, 529 US 217, 229 (2000)). In Keller v
State Bar of California, 496 US 112-13 (1990), the Court was more explicit about the
practical impossibility of extending the doctrinal structure of CSSD to include government
speech:
Government officials are expected as a part of the democratic process to represent
and to espouse the views of a majority of their constituents. . . . If every citizen
were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with
which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be
limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know
it radically transformed.
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First Amendment review should be triggered and when it should
not. Without such an explanation, the Court stands at risk of the
kind of untoward consequences and embarrassing pirouettes that
have afflicted its recent forays into this area.
I. CSSD AFTER JOHANNS
In 1985 Congress enacted the Beef Promotion and Research
Act,15 which announced that it was "in the public interest to au-
thorize the establishment. . of an orderly procedure for financing
(through assessments on all cattle sold in the United States and on
cattle, beef, and beef products imported into the United States) and
[for] carrying out a coordinated program of promotion and research
designed to strengthen the beef industry's position in the market-
place and to maintain and expand domestic and foreign markets
and uses for beef and beef products."16 The Act directed the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to establish a "Cattlemen's Beef Promotion
and Research Board,"' 7 whose members would "be cattle producers
and importers appointed by the Secretary,"' 8 and in particular to
establish a Beef Promotion Operating Committee, which would be
composed of ten Board members elected by the Board "and ten
producers elected by a federation that includes as members the
qualified State beef councils."' 9 The function of the Committee was
to "develop plans or projects of promotion and advertising, research,
consumer information, and industry information, which shall be
paid for with assessments collected by the Board."2
The Act provided that the promotional campaigns of the Com-
mittee and the Board were to be subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture, and that they were to be supported by an
excise tax, or "checkoff," on the sale or importation of cattle or on
the importation of beef products.2 ' Since 1988, "more than $1 bil-
lion has been collected through the checkoff and a large fraction
of that sum has been spent on promotional projects authorized by
57 USC §§ 2901-11 (2000).
7 USC § 2901(b).
.7 7 USC § 2904(1).
iS Id.
7 USC § 2904(4)(A).
20 7 USC § 2904(4)(B).
2 1Johanns, 125 S Ct at 2058.
[2005
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the Beef Act-many using the familiar trademarked slogan 'Beef.
It's What's for Dinner.' '
22
Two associations whose members paid the checkoff and several
individuals who raised and sold cattle brought suit objecting to
various statutory and constitutional aspects of the promotional pro-
gram sponsored by the Beef Board and its Operating Committee.
While their suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided United
States v United Foods, Inc., 23 in which the Court, over the dissenting
votes of Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, upheld a chal-
lenge to the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer In-
formation Act.24 The Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture
to create a Mushroom Council empowered to impose mandatory
assessments on handlers of fresh mushrooms in order to serve the
statute's goals of advancing projects of mushroom promotion, re-
search, consumer information, and industry information. 2' The
Court concluded that requiring mushroom growers to subsidize a
mushroom promotional campaign with which they disagreed vio-
lated their First Amendment rights.
The cattlemen amended their complaint to allege First Amend-
ment violations of a similar nature. The Eighth Circuit concluded
that "'[t]he beef checkoff program is, in all material respects, iden-
tical to the mushroom checkoff' at issue in United Foods."'26 Although
the Court in United Foods had pretermitted the claim that "the
advertising here is government speech, and so immune from the
scrutiny we would otherwise apply,"27 the Eighth Circuit held that
even on the assumption that the promotional programs sponsored
by the Beef Board were government speech, compelled subsidiza-
tion of the programs could be justified only if "the governmental
interest in the commercial advertising under the Beef Act is suffi-
ciently substantial to justify the infringement upon appellees' First
Amendment right not to be compelled to subsidize that commercial
22 Id at 2059 (citation omitted). The Eight Circuit found that at least 50% of the checkoff
funds were used to support advertising planned by the Operating Committee. 335 F3d at
717.
23 533 US 405 (2001).
4 7 USC §§ 6101-12 (2000).
2' 7 USC § 6104(c)(4).
26 335 F3d at 717 (quoting Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v U.S. Dep't of Agric., 207 F Supp 2d
992, 1002 (DSD 2002)).
27 United Foods, 533 US at 416. The reason offered by the Court was that "this argument
was 'not raised or addressed' in the Court of Appeals." Id.
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speech."28 Answering that inquiry in the negative, the Eighth Circuit
ruled that the beef checkoff program established by the Beef Pro-
motion and Research Act was unconstitutional on its face.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in Johanns v
Livestock Marketing Ass'n.29 The opinion for the Court was authored
by Justice Scalia. It was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by
Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Breyer. Scalia began his analysis
by dividing "First Amendment challenges to allegedly compelled
expression"" into two categories. He distinguished "true 'compelled
speech' cases, in which an individual is obliged personally to express
a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government,"'" from
"'compelled subsidy' cases, in which an individual is required by
the government to subsidize a message he disagrees with, expressed
by a private entity."32
Acknowledging that the Court in United Foods had struck down
"an assessment very similar to the beef checkoff, imposed to fund
mushroom advertising,"33 Scalia noted that United Foods had nev-
ertheless rested "on the assumption that the advertising was private
speech, not government speech."34 This assumption was decisive,
because Johanns announced the categorical rule that individuals
"have no First Amendment right not to fund government speech."35
Scalia did not seek to explain this rule, except to observe that "[s]ome
of our cases have justified compelled funding of government speech
by pointing out that government speech is subject to democratic
accountability. "36
2 335 F3d at 723.
29 125 S Ct 2055 (2005).
'°Johanns, 125 S Ct at 2060.
31 Id.
32 Id. In compelled subsidy cases "individuals are compelled not to speak, but to subsidize
a private message with which they disagree." Id at 2060-61.
" Id at 2061.
34 Id.
31 Id at 2063.
36 Id at 2064. Scalia also noted in a footnote that the compelled subsidization of private
speech violates the First Amendment "because being forced to fund someone else's private
speech unconnected to any legitimate government purpose violates personal autonomy."
Id at 2065 n 8. "Such a violation does not occur," Scalia continued, "when the exaction
funds government speech." Id. This reasoning does not distinguish Johanns from United
Foods, because the "government purpose" in United Foods was exactly the same as its purpose
in Jobanns: the stabilization and promotion of a market for American agricultural produce.
The categorical distinction between being compelled to subsidize private speech and being
[2005
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The debate in Johanns was whether the advertisements sponsored
by the beef checkoff program were in fact government speech. In
the years after United Foods, lower courts had more or less come to
the conclusion that the First Amendment did not prohibit the com-
pulsory funding of government speech,3 7 and they had articulated
an intricate jurisprudence to distinguish government from private
speech. This jurisprudence asked two questions. The first focused
on whether "the government nominally controls the production of
advertisements, but as a practical matter has delegated control over
the speech to a particular group that represents only one segment
of the population."38 The second focused on whether persons were
compelled to fund government speech through general taxation or
instead through "assessments levied on a particular group."39
]ohanns flatly rejects both these factors. Even though the pro-
motional campaigns of the Beef Board and its Operating Committee
compelled to subsidize government speech thus cannot be explained by the presence or
absence of a legitimate government purpose.
"7 Most courts differed in this regard from the Eighth Circuit decision in Livestock
Marketing. See text at note 10. For a classic statement, see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v
Sbewry, 384 F3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir 2004).
3 R.J. Reynolds, 384 F3d at 1136. See, e.g., Pelts & Skins, LLC v Landreneau, 365 F3d
423, 431 (5th Cir 2004) (holding that generic advertising authorized by the Louisiana Fur
and Alligator Advisory Council is not government speech in part because the Council
"reflects private rather than government interests"), vacated, 125 S Ct 2511 (2005); Cochran
v Veneman, 359 F3d 263, 279 (3d Cir 2004) (holding that government speech doctrine
does not apply to generic advertising by the National Dairy Promotion and Research
Board because the "promotional programs" created by the Dairy Promotion Stabilization
Act of 1983 are "special interest legislation on behalf of the industry's interest more so
than the government's"), vacated sub nom, Lovell v Cochran, 125 S Ct 2511 (2005), and
Johanns v Cochran, 125 S Ct 2512 (2005); Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v Veneman, 348 F3d
157, 161 (6th Cir 2003) ("[T]he pork industry's extensive control over the Pork Act's
promotional activities prevents their attribution to the government."), vacated sub nom,
Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v Campaign for Family Farms, 125 S Ct 2511 (2005), and Johanns
v Campaign for Family Farms, 125 S Ct 2511 (2005); In re Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n,
257 F Supp 2d 1274, 1281-82 (ED Wash 2003) (holding that government speech doctrine
does not apply to generic advertising by the Washington State Apple Commission because
"the Commission is not answerable to the State of Washington" and "the Government
retains virtually no control over the Commission").
39 Pelts & Skins, 365 F3d at 430. See Mich. Pork Producers, 348 F3d 157, 161-62 (6th
Cir 2003) ("[T]he Pork Act's promotion activities" are not government speech in part
because, "unlike tl~e typical scenario in which speech is considered governmental in nature,
the programs' funding does not come from general tax revenues. . . . The Pork Act's
funding comes solely from mandatory assessments paid by pork producers .... "); United
States v Frame, 885 F2d 1119, 1132 (3d Cir 1989) ("When the government allocates money
from the general tax fund to controversial projects or expressive activities, the nexus
between the message and the individual is attenuated. In contrast, where the government
requires a publicly identified group to contribute to a fund earmarked for the dissemination
of a particular message associated with that group, the government has directly focused
its coercive power for expressive purposes").
HeinOnline -- 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201 2005
202 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
were supported by assessments levied specifically on beef producers,
Johanns holds that the "First Amendment does not confer a right
to pay one's taxes into the general fund, because the injury of com-
pelled funding (as opposed to the injury of compelled speech) does
not stem from the Government's mode of accounting. ' And even
though as a practical matter the Beef Board and its Operating Com-
mittee were deliberately designed to include the interests of the
beef industry, Johanns holds that "[w]hen, as here, the government
sets the overall message to be communicated and approves every
word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the
government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance
from nongovernmental sources in developing specific messages. ''4'
Johanns also deems it irrelevant that the promotional campaign sub-
sidized by the Beef Board and its Operating Committee never an-
nounced that it was sponsored by the government, and indeed that
the campaign seemed to disguise that fact by producing advertise-
ments which typically displayed "the attribution 'Funded by Amer-
ica's Beef Producers.' 42
Johanns holds that a First Amendment claim of compelled speech,
as distinct from compelled subsidization of speech, would lie if the
Beef Board's advertisements "were attributed" to individual plain-
tiffs. 43 But such a claim of compelled speech could not be used to
attack the Beef Promotion and Research Act on its face. At most
it could be used to invalidate those particular applications of the
Act in which specific plaintiffs could produce credible evidence that
40 125 S Ct at 2063. "Apportioning the burden of funding government operations (in-
cluding speech) through taxes and other levies does not violate autonomy simply because
individual taxpayers feel 'singled out' or find the exaction 'galling."' Id at 2065 n 8.
4 Id at 2063. "Here, the beef advertisements are subject to political safeguards more
than adequate to set them apart from private messages. The program is authorized and
the basic message prescribed by federal statute, and specific requirements for the pro-
motions' content are imposed by federal regulations promulgated after notice and com-
ment. The Secretary of Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the program,
appoints and dismisses the key personnel, and retains absolute veto power over the ad-
vertisements' content, right down to the wording. And Congress, of course, retains over-
sight authority, not to mention the ability to reform the program at any time. No more
is required." Id at 2064.
42 Id at 2059 (citation omitted). "[T]he correct focus is not on whether the ads' audience
realizes the government is speaking, but on the compelled assessment's purported inter-
ference with respondents' First Amendment rights. As we hold today, respondents enjoy
no right not to fund government speech-whether by broad-based taxes or targeted as-
sessments, and whether or not the reasonable viewer would identify the speech as the
government's." Id at 2064 n 7.
41 Id at 2065.
[2005
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Beef Board advertisements were actually attributed to them. The
Court could see no such evidence in the record.
Justice Thomas joined Scalia's opinion for the Court, but he
wrote separately to emphasize his continuing allegiance to what he
regarded as the fundamental premise of United Foods, which was
"that '[a]ny regulation that compels the funding of advertising must
be subjected to the most stringent First Amendment scrutiny.""
Thomas, like Scalia, did not explain why this principle did not apply
to compelled funding of government speech.4" He pointed only to
the brute practicalities of the situation: "I recognize that this prin-
ciple must be qualified where the regulation compels the funding
of speech that is the government's own. It cannot be that all tax-
payers have a First Amendment objection to taxpayer-funded gov-
ernment speech, even if the funded speech is not 'germane' to some
broader regulatory program. '
Justice Breyer also authored a separate opinion. He had dissented
in United Foods on the grounds "that the challenged assessments
involved a form of economic regulation, not speech."47 Breyer joined
the opinion of the Court injohanns "[w]ith the caveat thatl continue
to believe that my dissent in United Foods offers a preferable ap-
proach. 48 Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment of the Court.
Although she refused to credit that the advertisements funded by
the checkoff program were "government speech," because they were
not "attributed to the Government,"49 she nevertheless continued
to maintain, as she had in United Foods, that "the assessments in
44Id at 2066 (Thomas, J, concurring) (quoting United Foods, 533 US 405, 419 (2001)
(Thomas, J, concurring)).
4" Thomas did note that "[t]he payment of taxes to the government for purposes of
supporting government speech is not nearly as intrusive as being forced to 'utter what is
not in [one's] mind,' or to carry an unwanted message on one's property." Id at 2067
(quoting W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v Barnette, 319 US 624, 634 (1942)). But of course this line of
thought would seem to suggest that in each case of subsidized speech, the presence or
absence of First Amendment concerns would depend upon the extent of intrusion created
by the precise method of subsidization. This would in turn undermine what Thomas
evidently regarded as the fundamental premise of United Foods, which was that the com-
pelled funding of speech always raised First Amendment concerns.
'6 Id at 2066. Thomas also stressed that "[t]he government may not, consistent with the
First Amendment, associate individuals or organizations involuntarily with speech by at-
tributing an unwanted message to them, whether or not those individuals fund the speech,
and whether or not the message is under the government's control." Id.
17 Id at 2067 (Breyer, J, concurring).
48 Id.
" Id at 2067 (Ginsburg, J, concurring in the judgment).
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these cases ...qualify as permissible economic regulation."5
Justice Souter authored the principal dissent; he was joined by
Stevens and Kennedy. He began with the premise that the facts of
Johanns were "on all fours with United Foods,"'" which had struck
down the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Infor-
mation Act because it "violated the growers' First Amendment right
to refuse to pay for expression when they object to its content."52
Souter agreed with the Court that there was a "need to recognize
the legitimacy of government's power to speak despite objections
by dissenters whose taxes or other exactions necessarily go in some
measure to putting the offensive message forward to be heard." 3
But he argued that on the facts of Johanns the advertisements of
the Beef Board and its Operating Committee ought not to be con-
sidered government speech.
Souter's argument is complex and not entirely transparent, but
its gist is that infringements of the "presumptive autonomy" 4 pro-
tected by the First Amendment against compelled subsidization of
speech must be evaluated not only in light of the state's interest in
requiring subsidization,"5 but also with an eye to the precise forms
of subsidization exacted by the state and to the mechanisms that
could potentially serve as "an effective political check on forced
funding for speech."56 Souter contrasted government speech sup-
ported by revenues secured through general taxation with govern-
ment speech supported by revenues secured through narrowly tar-
geted assessments, like those at issue in Johanns:
[When government funds its speech with general tax revenue,
as it usually does, no individual taxpayer or group of taxpayers
can lay claim to a special, or even a particularly strong, connection
to the money spent (and hence to the speech funded). Outrage
is likely to be rare, and disagreement tends to stay temperate.
'o Id at 2068.
sId at 2070 (Souter, J, dissenting).
52 Id at 2069.
s Id at 2070. Souter, like the other Justices who considered the question, seemed to
conceive the relationship between government speech and CSSD in terms of sheer practical
necessity. "To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment heckler's
veto of any forced contribution to raising the government's voice in the 'marketplace of
ideas' would be out of the question." Id.
1
4 Id at 2071.
" Souter interprets United Foods as prohibiting "compelled subsidy of speech... absent
a comprehensive regulatory scheme to which the speech was incidental." Id at 2068.
" Id at 2073 n 8.
[2005
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But the relative palatability of a remote subsidy shared by every
taxpayer is not to be found when the speech is funded with
targeted taxes. For then, as here, the particular interests of those
singled out to pay the tax are closely linked with the expression,
and taxpayers who disagree with it suffer a more acute limitation
on their presumptive autonomy as speakers to decide what to
say and what to pay for others to say.57
Souter's basic point is that the "autonomy" of persons to refuse to
fund speech with which they disagree grows more compromised as
the link between the subsidy and the speech becomes closer and
more direct.5 8 Speech supported by "a targeted assessment . . .
makes the First Amendment affront more galling."59 In such cir-
cumstances "greater care is required to assure that the political
s Id at 2071 (citation omitted).
s Seventeen years ago the Third Circuit, considering the same statute as that at issue
in Johanns, articulated this basic idea in terms of what it called a "coerced nexus" test:
Both the right to be free from compelled expressive association and the right to
be free from compelled affirmation of belief presuppose a coerced nexus between
the individual and the specific expressive activity. When the government allocates
money from the general tax fund to controversial projects or expressive activities,
the nexus between the message and the individual is attenuated. In contrast,
where the government requires a publicly identified group to contribute to a
fund earmarked for the dissemination of a particular message associated with
that group, the government has directly focused its coercive power for expressive
purposes. This sort of funding scheme, with its close nexus between the individual
and the message funded, more closely resembles the Abood situation, where the
unions, as exclusive bargaining agents, served as the locutors for a distinguishable
segment of the population, i.e., the employees, or the Wooley case, where the
state "require[d] an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological
message by displaying it on his property in a manner and for the express purpose
that it be observed and read by the public," regardless of whether the state-issued
license plates constituted "government speech."
United States v Frame, 885 F2d 1119, 1132-33 (3d Cir 1989) (citations omitted) (quoting
Wooley v Maynard, 430 US 705, 713 (1977)). The coerced nexus test was influential among
lower courts. See, e.g., Pelts & Skins, LLC v Landreneau, 365 F3d 423 (5th Cir 2004),
vacated, 125 S Ct 2511 (2005); Cal-Almond, Inc. v Calif. Dept. of Agric., 14 F3d 429, 435
(9th Cir 1993); Summit Med. Ctr of Ala., Inc. v Riley, 284 F Supp 2d 1350, 1360-61 (MD
Ala 2003). See also Fornm for Academic and Institutional Rights v Rumsfeld, 390 F3d 219,
259 (3d Cir 2004); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v Shewry, 384 F3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir 2004)
(Trott, J, dissenting).
SgJobanns, 12 5 S Ct at 2071. Souter invokes "the commonsense notion that individuals
feel a closer connection to speech that they are singled out to fund with targeted taxes
than they do to expression paid for with general revenues. We recognized this in Mas-
sachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447 (1923), where we noted that the individual taxpayer's
'interest in the moneys of the Treasury-partly realized from taxation and partly from
other sources-is shared with millions of others [and] is comparatively minute and in-
determinable.' Id. at 487. This commonsense notion, then, provides a 'principled way' to
distinguish in this context between targeted and general taxes." Id at 2071 n 4.
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process can practically respond to limit the compulsion .... 60
Souter conceives political accountability as ensuring "that gov-
ernment is not untouchable when its speech rubs against the First
Amendment interests of those who object to supporting it; if enough
voters disagree with what government says, the next election will
cancel the message."'" "[IThe requirement of effective public ac-
countability" is not met inJohanns, Souter argues, because "the Beef
Act does not establish an advertising scheme subject to effective
democratic checks. . . . [T]he ads are not required to show any
sign of being speech by the Government, and experience under the
Act demonstrates how effectively the Government has masked its
role in producing the ads."62 Souter thus concludes that the gov-
ernment speech exception to CSSD ought not to apply in Johanns:
"[E]xpression that is not ostensibly governmental, which govern-
ment is not required to embrace as publicly as it speaks, cannot
constitute government speech sufficient to justify enforcement of a
targeted subsidy to broadcast it."63
The exact function of political accountability in Souter's dissent
is obscure. Souter writes as if accountability were necessary to check
government taxation from becoming too violently inconsistent with
the First Amendment interests of those forced to subsidize gov-
ernment speech. But why political accountability would perform
this function is never explained. It is true that we can expect voters
to cancel messages that they dislike, but voters have no particular
reason to cancel those messages that especially violate the autonomy
of taxpayers. It may be that cattlemen deeply object to, and find
60 Id at 2071-72 (Souter, J, dissenting). Such scrutiny would be practical, Souter argues,
because "[w]hereas it would simply be unrealistic to think that every speech subsidy from
general revenue could or should be scrutinized for its amenability to effective political
response, the less-common targeted speech subsidies can be reviewed specifically for their
susceptibility to response by the voters, and the intensity of the provocation experienced
by the targeted group justifies just such scrutiny." Id at 2072.
6' Id at 2071.
62 Id at 2072. "It means nothing," Souter writes, "that Government officials control the
message if that fact is never required to be made apparent to those who get the message,
let alone if it is affirmatively concealed from them. The political accountability of the
officials with control is insufficient, in other words, just because those officials are allowed
to use their control (and in fact are deliberately using it) to conceal their role from the
voters with the power to hold them accountable." Id at 2073.
63 Id at 2073-74. Justice Kennedy in Johanns filed a short separate opinion to note that
he would "reserve for another day the difficult First Amendment questions that would
arise if the government were to target a discrete group of citizens to pay even for speech
that the government does 'embrace as publicly as it speaks."' Id at 2068 (Kennedy, J,
dissenting).
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especially galling, a message that is quite popular with voters. Public
approval of a message does not seem a plausible candidate for a
mechanism to prevent the abuse of the autonomy of targeted tax-
payers.64
Souter proposes that the First Amendment interest protected by
CSSD is the "autonomy"65 not to be connected through the medium
of money to speech to which one objects. Souter invokes the "com-
monsense notion" that this "connection" can be "closer" or less
close,6 6 depending upon the directness of the relationship between
the subsidy and the speech it funds. As the connection grows closer,
the violation of First Amendment autonomy grows greater; as the
connection becomes more distant, the violation diminishes in sig-
nificance. That is why for Souter the doctrinal notion of "govern-
ment speech" is at most a label used to express the outcome of a
detailed process of constitutional analysis and balancing. Souter's
dissent is in fact carefully written to avoid the implication that
"government speech" is a categorical exception to CSSD. Souter
asks only whether the interests served by a particular instance of
"government speech" are "sufficient to justify enforcement of a
targeted subsidy to broadcast it."67
In contrast, Scalia's majority opinion conceives "government
speech" as a distinct category of expression that obliterates whatever
First Amendment interest persons may have in not being required
to subsidize the speech of others. Although Scalia apparently agrees
with Souter that the underlying constitutional interest at stake is
64I do not mean to deny, of course, that there may be circumstances in which First
Amendment jurisprudence should care very deeply about political accountability. The
Constitution ought to be concerned, for example, about the distortions potentially inflicted
upon the marketplace of ideas whenever the government enters public debate by stealth,
as apparently occurred when the Department of Health and Human Services packaged
video segments promoting a Medicare bill to look like news reports and paid to broadcast
them during local news telecasts, or when the Department of Education paid the columnist
Armstrong Williams to promote the No Child Left Behind Act in his capacity as a television
pundit. See generally Clay Calvert, Payola, Pundits, and the Press: Weighing the Pros and
Cons of FCC Regulation, 13 Commlaw Conspectus 245 (2005); Gregory Klass, The Very
Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 UC Davis L Rev 1087,
1128-29 (2005). But the constitutional issues raised by government stealth do not depend
upon whether government speech is funded by a general tax or by targeted assessments.
These issues are structural and do not involve the "autonomy" First Amendment rights
of individual taxpayers.
s See text at note 57.
66 See note 59 above.
1
7Johanns, 125 S Ct at 2073 (Souter, J, dissenting).
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one of "personal autonomy,"68 he conceptualizes the "government
speech" exception to CSSD as categorical and without qualifications
of degree.69 A First Amendment question is presented if persons
are compelled to support the speech of a private individual, but not
if persons are taxed, whether by a general tax or by a targeted
assessment, to support the speech of the government. Scalia's ap-
proach seems to advance a clear and forceful rule, but it actually
renders quite mysterious the nature of the First Amendment in-
terests that CSSD aspires to protect. Exactly what kind of interests
would require stringent First Amendment scrutiny to prevent the
compelled subsidization of the expression of private parties, but no
scrutiny at all to prevent the compelled subsidization of government
speech?
The strangely dichotomous character of the First Amendment
interests presupposed by Scalia is especially puzzling because we
know that the First Amendment interests of persons in what Scalia
at the outset of his opinion calls "true 'compelled speech' cases"7
do not disappear when persons are compelled to express the message
of the government. Scalia cites two compelled speech cases: West
Virginia Board of Education v Barnette,71 in which schoolchildren were
required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, the text of which was
set out by state regulation, and Wooley v Maynard,72 in which George
Maynard, a Jehovah's witness, was required to display the state
motto of New Hampshire on the prefabricated license plate of his
automobile. In each case the relevant message was composed by
the government. In each case the First Amendment was interpreted
to protect a right "to refrain from speaking at all,"73 and in each
case it did not matter whether the message whose utterance was
compelled was that of the government or that of a private party.
Johanns itself establishes that there is no "government speech"
exception to claims of compelled speech, for it holds that plaintiffs'
allegation of compelled speech can succeed if they are able to prove
68 See notes 36 and 40.
61 Scalia never explains why autonomy interests cannot be more or less violated, de-
pending upon the closeness of the connection between the subsidy and the speech.
70 125 S Ct at 2060.
71 319 US 624 (1943).
72 430 US 705 (1977).
73 Wooley, 430 US at 714. See Barnette, 319 US at 634 ("[A] Bill of Rights which guards
the individual's right to speak his own mind" does not leave it "open to public authorities
to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.").
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on remand that the Beef Board's advertisements were "attributed"
to them individually.74 Because Johanns holds that these advertise-
ments are government speech, the Court necessarily concludes that
plaintiffs have First Amendment interests in not being compelled
to express government speech. But surely it is puzzling that First
Amendment interests in not being compelled to speak are indif-
ferent to whether the compelled speech is governmental or private,
whereas First Amendment interests in not being compelled to sub-
sidize speech depend entirely upon this distinction. Why should
this be so?
What renders the question particularly disturbing is that Scalia's
distinction between compelled speech cases and compelled subsidy
cases is itself highly uncertain. In Wooley, for example, nobody could
plausibly have imagined that George Maynard was actually speaking
through the prefabricated license plate he was forced to display. In-
deed (then) Justice Rehnquist dissented in Wooley, asking why there
was "any 'speech' or 'speaking' in the context of this case. . . . The
issue, unconfronted by the Court, is whether appellees, in displaying,
as they are required to do, state license tags, the format of which is
known to all as having been prescribed by the State, would be con-
sidered to be advocating political or ideological views."7 5
The Court could not respond to Rehnquist's challenge; it could
only vaguely mutter that "compelling the affirmative act of a flag
salute [in Barnette] involved a more serious infringement upon per-
sonal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a
license plate, but the difference is essentially one of degree." Wooley
tells us that:
Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which
forces an individual, as part of his daily life indeed constantly
while his automobile is in public view to be an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he
finds unacceptable. . . . New Hampshire's statute in effect re-
quires that appellees use their private property as a "mobile bill-
board" for the State's ideological message or suffer a penalty, as
Maynard already has.76
Having one's car transformed into a "mobile billboard" for state
74Johanns, 125 S Ct at 2065.
71 Wooley, 430 US at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J, dissenting).
76 Id at 715.
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messages is not precisely the same as being forced to speak. It is
more like being forced to allow one's car to be used as a platform
for the state to speak. This suggests that Wooley is not so much
about George Maynard's First Amendment interest in not being
forced to speak as it is about his First Amendment interest in not
having his property appropriated to subsidize government speech.
But Johanns seems to hold that this interest does not exist.
Souter's dissenting opinion is by contrast free from such internal
tensions. He begins with the premise that a First Amendment au-
tonomy interest is compromised whenever persons are required to
subsidize speech with which they disagree, and he applies this prem-
ise to the context of government speech. Souter postulates that
government speech subsidized by general taxation so minimally af-
fects this autonomy interest as to be beyond judicial protection. But
he concludes that this interest remains vivid and enforceable in the
context of government speech supported by targeted assessments.
This logic is faithful to the structure of CSSD as set forth in United
Foods. The difficulty, however, is that Souter's dissent is based upon
a false premise.
II. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CSSD
Consider the case of Banning v Newdow,77 in which Michael
Newdow, the same prickly pro se litigant who challenged the con-
stitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance,78 was involved in an "on-
going child custody proceeding."79 Newdow objected to an order
"to pay a portion of the attorney's fees of the child's mother."8 He
advanced the argument, which no doubt would be unthinkable to
a trained lawyer, that the order was unconstitutional because of
CSSD. Newdow contended that requiring him to pay the attorneys'
fees of his opponent was to compel him directly to subsidize ex-
pression with which he disagreed. Because the speech of the op-
posing attorney was private, Newdow's argument is not affected by
the holding of Johanns, which purports to leave in place the doctrinal
structure of CSSD that was established in United Foods.
Newdow's innovative argument should make us pause, because,
7 14 Cal Rptr 3d 447 (Ct App 2004).
'8 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004).
Banning, 14 Cal Rptr 3d at 449.
80 Id.
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in a literal sense, all statutes awarding attorneys' fees force "certain
individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object."'" Sou-
ter's dissent in Johanns postulates an intrinsic "autonomy" interest
in not being forced to pay for the speech of another, and it con-
ceptualizes the strength of this interest as dependent upon the close-
ness of the connection between the subsidy and the speech it sup-
ports. We should note, therefore, that in Newdow's case this
connection is as close and as direct as it is possible to be. And of
course Newdow vigorously disagrees with the speech that he is
forced to subsidize, for it is the expression of his opponent in lit-
igation.
The logic of CSSD would thus support Newdow's position. Al-
though that logic does not establish whether any particular attor-
neys' fees statute is constitutional or unconstitutional, it does raise
the question of whether all such statutes must be given careful First
Amendment attention.82 Newdow's argument forces us to ask
whether we should regard all attorneys' fees statutes as raising con-
stitutional concerns that need to be adjudicated on a statute-by-
statute basis."
The Newdow case is only the tip of the iceberg, for there are
many ordinary situations in which government compels persons
directly to pay for the speech of third parties. Consider, for example,
the requirement that cars can be registered only if mechanics are
11 United States v United Foods, Inc., 533 US 405, 410 (2001).
12 To invoke a distinction that is associated with the work of Frederick Schauer, we must
in such cases distinguish between First Amendment "coverage," which requires "that the
constitutionality of [a] regulation must be determined by reference to First Amendment
doctrine and analysis," and First Amendment "protection," which implies that the First
Amendment renders a particular regulation unconstitutional. Robert Post, Encryption
Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 Berkeley Tech L J 713, 714 (2000). See Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 Harv L Rev 1765, 1769-72 (2004). CSSD is above all a doctrine that is
designed to define the scope of First Amendment coverage, as distinct from First Amend-
ment protection. In fact both the Court and Souter have been notably reluctant to specify
a test for First Amendment protection. See, e.g., United Foods, 533 US at 410; Johanns,
12 5 S Ct at 2074 n 10 (Souter, J, dissenting).
83 The court in Newdow knew that it had to reject Newdow's claim, but it didn't know
quite how to do so, and as a consequence it could only sputter that CSSD is not relevant
unless the "only purpose" of "compelled assessments" is "to support the offensive
speech. . . . Here the purpose of the fee award is to ensure that a child's best interests
are represented." Banning, 14 Cal Rptr 3d at 449. The problem with this reasoning is that
it misrepresents United Foods, in which the federal government had imposed targeted
assessments in order to stabilize and promote the market for mushrooms, just as the
targeted assessments in Johanns were for the purpose of stabilizing and promoting the
market for beef. It will be a rare case indeed in which the state compels speech for no
reason at all.
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paid to certify that they meet smog emission standards.84 Consider
the requirement that children can be enrolled in public school only
if physicians are paid to certify their immunization records.85 Or
consider the requirement that publicly owned businesses pay for
the financial reports of independent accountants.86 We must decide
whether these everyday government regulations have all along posed
deep, unrecognized First Amendment issues, or whether, like the
government speech at issue in Jobanns, they do not present any
constitutional question at all.87
These examples suggest that there are strong reasons to conclude
that First Amendment concerns are not always triggered whenever
persons are forced to subsidize the speech of a third party. This
conclusion would render CSSD consistent with First Amendment
" Forced to conduct emissions inspections by federal clean-air rules, many states have
outsourced their inspection duties by relying on a "decentralized network [that] uses
gasoline stations or repair facilities as test centers." See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality
Protection Using State Implementation Plans: Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15
Vill Envtl LJ 209, 265 (2004).
"' See, e.g., Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 15-872 (2002) ("A pupil [unless exempted] shall not
be allowed to attend school without submitting documentary proof [of vaccination] to the
school administrator .... "); Ark Code Ann § 6-18-702 (1999) (conditioning attendance
in school on multiple vaccinations "as evidenced by a certificate of a licensed physician
or a public health department acknowledging the immunization"); La Rev Stat Ann § 17:
170 (2001); NH Rev Stat Ann § 141-C:20 (1996); Conn Agencies Regs § 10-204a-2a
(2000); NM Code R § 6.12.2.1-11 (Weil 2001). See generally James G. Hodge, Jr., and
Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social and Legal Perspectives,
90 Ky L J 831, 833 (2001-2002) (summarizing state laws and stating that "modern state
school vaccination laws mandate that children be vaccinated prior to being allowed to
attend public or private schools. Failure to vaccinate children can result in children being
denied from attending school, civil fines and criminal penalties .... " ).
" See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC § 77aa(25) sched A (2000) (requiring that
balance sheets and profit and loss statements included in registration statements be certified
by an independent accountant); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78m(a)(2)
(2000) (authorizing the SEC to require that financial statements included in annual reports
be certified by an independent accountant).
" It might be said that some of these situations do not implicate CSSD because the
First Amendment is triggered only when government compels "certain individuals to pay
subsidies for speech to which they object." United Foods, 533 US at 410 (emphasis added).
We do not object, so the argument might run, to a mechanic's certification that our car
meets smog emission requirements, or to a physician's certification that our child meets
immunization requirements. But this argument misses the point that the mechanic or the
physician may at least initially give us bad news and communicate to us that our car has
failed to meet emission requirements or that our child requires yet another vaccination.
We may vigorously disagree with this speech, but the government will nevertheless have
effectively forced us to pay for it, on pain of not driving our car or not enrolling our
children in public school. The question is whether this potential disagreement should raise
a First Amendment problem for these statutes. I pass over the example of required financial
statements, because I assume that if a CPA is performing her job with proper professional
independence her financial statements will routinely contain assertions to which her client
might object.
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jurisprudence generally, because First Amendment concerns are not
automatically activated whenever expression is restricted.88 I have
argued the point at length elsewhere and will not repeat those
arguments here.89 Suffice it to note that because speech and ex-
pression are intrinsic to all human conduct, the regulation of con-
duct inevitably involves the regulation of the communication that
defines the conduct. If virtually every regulation of conduct became
a constitutional question, the First Amendment would rapidly be-
come unworkable. For this reason, our First Amendment is not
triggered whenever communication is regulated; we do not have a
First Amendment jurisprudence of contracts, even though contracts
subsist entirely within the realm of expression.9 ° Constitutional re-
view is triggered only when communication is regulated in a manner
that implicates specific First Amendment values. As I have argued
elsewhere, these values most conspicuously include democratic self-
governance and participation in the construction of public opin-
ion.91
Just as the First Amendment is not triggered by all restrictions
on speech, so the First Amendment is not triggered by all govern-
ment compulsions to speak. In fact we experience such compulsions
all the time, and no one regards them as raising constitutional issues.
Examples range from compulsory jury service,9 2 to compulsory tes-
timony before courts and legislatures,93 to compulsory reporting of
88 Schauer at 1769-86 (cited in note 82).
" Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L Rev 1, 9-10
(2000); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan L Rev 1249, 1254-55
(1995).
9' Consistent with his dissent in Johanns and his acceptance of the major premise of
CSSD, Justice Souter has advocated that First Amendment protections should attach to
"speech as such." Glickman v Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 US 457, 478 (1997) (Souter, J,
dissenting). I cannot believe, however, that Souter would want plenary constitutional review
of contract law.
"' See note 89 above.
92 See, e.g., 28 USC § 1861 (2000) ("It is further the policy of the United States that
all citizens shall ... have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that
purpose."); Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94
Mich L Rev 2673, 2683 ("Fining those who failed to obey [jury] summonses [was] a
universal response to jury dodging throughout the colonial period, and in the early 1800s
. . .. 1").
" On numerous occasions the Supreme Court has found it to be "beyond controversy
that one of the duties which the citizen owes to his government is to support the admin-
istration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly
summoned." Blackmer v United States, 284 US 421, 438 (1932). Thus the Court has re-
affirmed that "neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision protects
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vehicle accidents,94 to compulsory reporting of potential public
health risks like those involving child abuse,9" to the myriad of public
disclosures required by securities regulation,96 to the labeling re-
quirements routinely required on consumer products.97 The very
Beef Promotion and Research Act considered by Johanns provides
the average citizen from disclosing to a grand jury information that he has received in
confidence." Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665, 682 (1972).
" Most states require drivers to report their involvement in traffic accidents that have
resulted in injury or significant property damage. See, e.g., Cal Veh Code § 20002 (West
2005); NY Veh & Traf Law § 605 (McKinney 2005). While the Supreme Court has never
entertained a compelled speech challenge to these statutes, in California v Byers, 402 US
424 (1971), the Court rejected the claim that such hit-and-run laws violate the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, explaining that:
An organized society imposes many burdens on its constituents. It commands
the filing of tax returns for income; it requires producers and distributors of
consumer goods to file informational reports on the manufacturing process and
the content of products, on the wages, hours, and working conditions of em-
ployees. Those who borrow money on the public market or issue securities for
sale to the public must file various information reports; industries must report
periodically the volume and content of pollutants discharged into our waters and
atmosphere. Comparable examples are legion.
Id at 427-28. Mandatory reporting laws of these kinds have never been thought to raise
First Amendment concerns.
" Virtually every state has some version of a mandatory reporting law to cover cases of
child abuse. See Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect (pt 1), 50 NC L Rev 293,
332 (1972). Some states have extended the duty to report abuse to other areas, as for
example by making the "[flailure to report elder mistreatment to public authorities ...
typically a criminal offense." Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf: Elder
Abuse and Neglect-The Legal Framework, 31 Conn L Rev 77, 117 (1998).
96 See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 81 Wash U L Q 417, 427 (2003) ("Disclosure is the SEC's chief
regulatory tool.").
97 Just to offer some few examples enforced by the FTC, the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act, 15 USC §§ 1451-61 (2000), directs the FTC to issue regulations requiring that all
consumer commodities other than food, drugs, therapeutic devices, and cosmetics be
labeled to disclose net contents, identity of commodity, and name and place of business
of the product's manufacturer, packer, or distributor; the Truth in Lending Act, 15 USC
§§ 1601-1667f (2000), requires all creditors who deal with consumers to make certain
written disclosures concerning all finance charges and related aspects of credit transactions
(including disclosing finance charges expressed as an annual percentage rate); the Wool
Products Labeling Act, 15 USC §§ 68-68j (2000), requires (1) that wool product labels
indicate the country in which the product was processed or manufactured, and (2) that
mail order promotional materials clearly and conspicuously state whether a wool product
was processed or manufactured in the United States or was imported; the Fur Products
Labeling Act, 15 USC §§ 69-69j (2000), requires that articles of apparel made of fur be
labeled, and that invoices and advertising for furs and fur products specify, among other
things, the true English name of the animal from which the fur was taken, and whether
the fur is dyed or used; the Textile Products Identification Act, 15 USC §§ 70-70k (2000),
requires (1) that any textile fiber product processed or manufactured in the United States
be so identified, and (2) that mail order promotional materials clearly and conspicuously
indicate whether a textile fiber product was processed or manufactured in the United
States or was imported.
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that marketers and importers of beef and cattle shall "maintain and
make available for inspection such books and records as may be
required by the order and file reports at the time, in the manner,
and having the content prescribed by"98 a "beef promotion and
research order" issued by the Secretary of Agriculture.99
There are thus innumerable circumstances in which the state
forces persons to speak without raising First Amendment con-
cerns.' ° If speech can be compelled without triggering constitu-
tional scrutiny, afortiori the subsidization of speech can be required
without raising First Amendment concerns. The First Amendment
interest in not being compelled to subsidize particular speech de-
rives from the First Amendment interest in not being compelled
to express that particular speech. Hence if the state can compel a
person to speak without triggering First Amendment scrutiny, it
can also force that person to pay for the speech. Because speaking
generally consumes resources, the compulsion to speak is often
simultaneously the compulsion to subsidize speech. It would in such
circumstances be strange indeed to hold that requiring a person to
speak does not raise First Amendment concerns, but requiring him
" 7 USC § 2904(11) (2000).
99 7 USC § 2903(b) (2000).
"0 This conclusion is confirmed by the Court's recent decision in Rumsfeld v Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights, 2006 WL 521237 (US March 6, 2006). The Court eval-
uated the argument of law schools that the so-called Solomon Amendment, which required
law schools to provide access to military recruiters, was an unconstitutional violation of
the First Amendment because it compelled law schools to speak, as for example by sending
out announcements about the time and place at which students could meet military re-
cruiters. The Court unanimously held that compelling such speech did not raise a First
Amendment question:
There is nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge or
motto that the school must endorse.
The compelled speech to which the law schools point is plainly incidental to
the Solomon Amendment's regulation of conduct, and "it has never been deemed
an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." . . . Compelling a law
school that sends scheduling e-mails for other recruiters to send one for a military
recruiter is simply not the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or
forcing a Jehovah's Witness to display the motto "Live Free or Die," and it
trivializes the freedom protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest that it is.
Although the Court attempts to use the old and ultimately circular difference between
speech and conduct to explain the distinction between compelled speech that raises a First
Amendment question and compelled speech that does not raise a First Amendment ques-
tion, for our purposes it is enough to notice that the Court does feel compelled to introduce
and defend some such distinction. The Court plainly understands that a serious First
Amendment question is not raised by every instance of compelled speech.
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to expend the resources for that speech does. The inevitable con-
clusion is that the compelled subsidization of speech does not by
itself trigger First Amendment scrutiny.
CSSD, however, focuses specifically on the subsidization of ob-
jectionable speech. United Foods asserts that "First Amendment con-
cerns apply" whenever the state requires persons to "subsidize
speech with which they disagree." ''  The basic logic seems to be
that because First Amendment scrutiny should be triggered when-
ever a person is forced to speak in ways that she finds objectionable,
First Amendment review ought also to be triggered whenever a
person is forced to subsidize speech she finds objectionable. But
the premise of this reasoning is false. First Amendment concerns
are not automatically aroused when persons are forced to speak in
ways that they find objectionable. Persons may experience as per-
sonally "galling"' 2 their obligation to testify before a court or a
legislature; they may wish to refuse to pronounce a verdict as a
juror; they may object to their responsibility to report a traffic
accident; or they may find it repulsive to report an incident of child
abuse. But in all these situations we nevertheless compel persons
to speak without ever raising a First Amendment eyebrow.
We also compel persons to speak in ways that they believe to be
flatly incorrect. High administration officials must mouth official
administration positions, whether they believe them or not, and the
First Amendment will offer no solace if they are fired for voicing
their actual beliefs."°3 Every day in state bureaucracies around the
nation, government employees are required to draft memoranda
setting forth positions with which they privately disagree.'0 4 We
require corporations to file independent financial statements, even
if they happen to disagree with the judgments made by their ac-
101 United States v United Foods, Inc., 533 US 405, 410-11 (2001).
102 See Johanns, 125 S Ct at 2071 (Souter, J, dissenting).
103 See, e.g., Wilbur v Mahan, 3 F3d 214, 215 (7th Cir 1993); Snyder v Blagojevich, 332
F Supp 2d 1132, 1139-40 (ND Ill 2004).
104 See, e.g., Hunsinger v State Pers. Bd., No C040744, 2003 WL 21268041 (Cal Ct App,
June 3, 2003). In Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 146 (1983), the Court set out the general
rule that "[w]hen employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the
name of the First Amendment." Even Justice Brennan, dissenting in Connick, stated his
view that "[plerhaps the simplest example of a statement by a public employee that would
not be protected by the First Amendment would be answering 'No' to a request that the
employee perform a lawful task within the scope of his duties." Id at 164 n 3 (Brennan,
J, dissenting).
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countants.105 On pain of failure we require students in public schools
to offer the right answers to questions, even if any particular student
privately believes that these answers are false.1°6 On pain of pun-
ishment we require soldiers in the army to salute and exclaim "Yes,
Sir" when they converse with an officer, even if any particular soldier
personally believes that his officer does not merit these expressions
of respect."°7 On pain of tort liability we require doctors to com-
municate sufficient information to their patients to provide for in-
formed consent, even if particular doctors privately believe that this
information is misleading and harmful to their patients.0 8 These
forms of compelled speech proceed without First Amendment scru-
tiny. If speech of this kind can be compelled, a fortiori the subsi-
dization of this speech can also be compelled. If the former does
not raise First Amendment questions, neither does the latter.
These examples suggest that compelling persons to subsidize
speech with which they disagree does not automatically arouse First
Amendment concerns. No doubt constitutional scrutiny can be trig-
gered, and easily triggered, depending upon a variety of factors,
including the nature of the speech, the context of the regulation,
and so forth. But the mere fact that individuals have been compelled
to subsidize speech with which they disagree is not sufficient to
justify constitutional scrutiny. Constitutional review is not forth-
coming unless it is also demonstrated that the required subsidization
of speech compromises specifically First Amendment values. As I
have already noted, and as the examples we have just considered
attest, these values paradigmatically involve democratic self-gov-
ernance and participation in the formation of public opinion.1"9
' See note 86 above.
106 There are numerous cases filed by students asserting that they had supplied the correct
answer on an examination and were graded incorrecdy. In Susan M. v New York Law School, 76
NY2d 241 (1990), for example, a law student objected to losing credit because she answered
based on New York law a question that was intended to test her knowledge of Delaware law.
Affirming the right of educators to set their own standards for what constitutes a correct
examination answer, the Court stated that "the pedagogical evaluation of her test grades [is] a
determination best left to educators rather than the courts .... " Id at 243. See also Thomas
A. Schweitzer, "Academic Challenge" Cases: Should Judicial Review Extend to Academic Evaluation
of Students? 41 Am U L Rev 267, 367 (1992) (surveying cases, and chronicling "the long-
standing tradition of deference to academic evaluations [that] seems likely to remain strong for
some time to come").
"' McCord v Page, 124 F2d 68, 70 (5th Cir 1941) ("Military regulations requiring a
soldier to salute his superior officers and . . . the enforcement of the regulations by a
proper military tribunal does not violate the Constitution of the United States.").
o Barcai v Betwee, 50 P3d 946 (Haw 2002); Brown v Dibbell, 595 NW2d 358 (Wis 1999).
'o See note 89 above.
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Although there can be no comprehensive theoretical account of
when state regulations implicate First Amendment values, we gen-
erally have well-developed constitutional intuitions about when re-
strictions on speech threaten to compromise First Amendment val-
ues. The problem is that these intuitions are clouded in the context
of CSSD, because the very idea of compulsion seems constitution-
ally suspicious11 and because laws that coerce persons to pay for
the speech of others are strange and unfamiliar. The resulting con-
fusion is plainly evident in the painful uncertainty evinced by the
Court in its Glickman-United Foods-Johanns trilogy.
In the remainder of this essay, therefore, I shall postulate two
simple heuristic principles that may prove helpful in educating our
instincts in the context of CSSD. The principles function to connect
the opaque and exotic circumstances of CSSD to the more familiar
issues posed by cases involving compelled speech and restrictions
on the subsidization of speech. I call these two principles the Non-
Endorsement Principle and the Symmetry Principle.
The Non-Endorsement Principle is activated whenever subsi-
dizing objectionable speech puts an individual in the position of
appearing to endorse that speech. If the Non-Endorsement Prin-
ciple applies, claims of compelled subsidization of speech merge
into claims of compelled speech. Whenever the Non-Endorsement
Principle applies, therefore, claims of compelled subsidization of
speech will trigger constitutional review if claims of compelled
speech would trigger constitutional review.
Wooley is best understood as a case involving the Non-Endorse-
ment Principle. Although it is implausible to imagine that George
Maynard was compelled actually to speak, it is clear that he was
compelled to subsidize state speech by displaying the New Hamp-
shire motto on the license plate of his car. The Court's reference
to a "mobile billboard" suggests that it interpreted existing social
conventions as supporting the conclusion that those who display
slogans on their automobiles endorse those slogans. The particular
way in which New Hampshire forced Maynard to subsidize its
motto, therefore, implicated the Non-Endorsement Principle,
which converted Maynard's claim of compelled subsidization of
speech into a claim of compelled speech.
Because strict constitutional scrutiny would have been triggered
,l See United Foods, 533 US at 418 n * (Stevens, J, concurring).
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if New Hampshire had compelled Maynard to affirm its motto, so
strict constitutional scrutiny was triggered when New Hampshire
instead forced Maynard to subsidize the display of its motto in a
manner that could be understood as constituting endorsement. By
contrast, if New Hampshire had merely required Maynard to display
a license plate with numbers, it is very doubtful that First Amend-
ment concerns would arise, because in such circumstances a claim
of compelled speech would not trigger constitutional scrutiny. From
a constitutional point of view, it would be no different than the
state requiring Maynard to retain and display a social security card
or a draft card. The application of the Non-Endorsement Principle
thus does not trigger strict constitutional scrutiny unless, in the
relevant context, a claim of compelled speech would trigger such
scrutiny.
Not every subsidization of objectionable speech implicates the
Non-Endorsement Principle. In PruneYard Shopping Center v Rob-
ins,"' for example, the Court held that state constitutional provi-
sions authorizing "individuals to exercise free speech and petition
rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center to which
the public is invited"' 2 did not raise First Amendment concerns,
even though these provisions required owners of shopping centers
to make their property available for the speech of others with whom
they could be in deep disagreement." 3 The Court distinguished
Wooley on the ground that the state constitutional provisions failed
to implicate the Non-Endorsement Principle, because the views of
persons "passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition
• . . will not likely be identified with those of the owner. ' 14
447 US 74 (1980).
112 Id at 76.
3 Recently, in Rumsfeld v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 2006 VVL 521237
(US March 6, 2006), the Court emphasized this distinction between the compelled sub-
sidization of speech and the compelled endorsement of speech. Speaking in the context
of a statute known as the Solomon Amendment that in effect required law shcools to
subsidize the speech of military recruiters, the Court invoked Prnneyard and concluded
that "[niothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by re-
cruiters, . . .We have held that high school students can appreciate the difference between
speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally required to do so,
pursuant to an equal access policy."
... Id at 87. The Court also noted two additional factors:
[Nit specific message is dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants'
property. There consequently is no danger of governmental discrimination for
or against a particular message. Finally, as far as appears here appellants can
expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in
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The distinction between compelled subsidizations of speech that
implicate the Non-Endorsement Principle and those that do not is
neatly captured in johanns' ruling that the case should be remanded
to determine if plaintiffs can establish that the advertisements of
the Beef Board and its Operating Committee were actually attrib-
utable to them individually. If the advertisements are not so attrib-
utable, plaintiffs' allegations would not implicate the Non-En-
dorsement Principle and accordingly their claim of compelled
subsidization of speech would not merge with a claim of compelled
speech.
The Symmetry Principle has two prongs. The first holds that if
state restrictions on the ability of persons to pay for the speech of
another do not raise First Amendment questions, so also state com-
pulsions to pay for the speech of another will not, in the absence
of special circumstances like a violation of the Non-Endorsement
Principle, raise First Amendment questions. Although there are of
course important differences between prohibitions of action and
affirmative duties to act, these differences do not typically include
First Amendment interests. If restrictions on the subsidization of
speech do not raise First Amendment concerns, these concerns are
unlikely to be created by the mere fact of legal compulsion, which
does not independently infuse First Amendment values into trans-
actions where these values are not otherwise present.
The point is well illustrated by regulations limiting the price of
professional services. We pay high fees to lawyers or doctors in
order to receive the benefit of their wisdom, but no First Amend-
ment review would be required if the government were to limit
professional fees. " ' This is because we do not ordinarily regard the
the area where the speakers or handbillers stand.
Id.
115 In recent years, an increasing number of legislatures and courts have placed hard
limits on the amount a lawyer can receive in a contingency fee arrangement. See generally
Richard M. Birnholz, Comment, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 37
UCLA L Rev 949, 951 n 9 (1990) ("Five states already impose a fixed or sliding scale
maximum for all or most tort suits. Two states accomplish this by statute and three by
court rule."). Such limits have been upheld by courts on several occasions. See, e.g., Am.
Trial Lawyers Ass'n v N.J. Sup. Ct., 330 A2d 350 (NJ 1974); Gair v Peck, 160 NE2d 43
(NY 1959). Rather that raising First Amendment issues, these laws have been subject only
to the general restriction that "[p]rice control, like any other form of regulation, is un-
constitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy
the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference
with individual liberty." Nebbia v New York, 291 US 502, 539 (1934). No one considered
the First Amendment to be implicated by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (ESA),
which authorized the Nixon Administration to impose price controls on goods and services.
[2005
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payment of fees for professional advice as transactions that are in-
fused with First Amendment value. The Symmetry Principle would
thus suggest that in the absence of special considerations First
Amendment concerns would also not be raised by laws requiring
the payment of professional fees. The fact of compulsion may arouse
libertarian apprehensions, but it does not independently endow
these transactions with specifically First Amendment values. That
is why Newdow was correct to conclude that statutes providing for
attorneys' fees ought not as a general matter to trigger First Amend-
ment scrutiny."6 Certainly no one would claim that the order re-
quiring Newdow to pay the fees of his wife's attorney implicates
the Non-Endorsement Principle.
The second prong of the Symmetry Principle holds that if state
restrictions on the ability of persons to pay for the speech of another
do raise First Amendment questions, state requirements that per-
sons affirmatively provide such support will likely trigger First
Amendment review. I say "likely" because sometimes First Amend-
ment interests are understood to inhere in the right of an audience
to hear, rather than in the right of a speaker to communicate," 7
and in such cases First Amendment scrutiny would be appropriate
to review government efforts to restrict communication but not
necessarily government efforts to compel communication."' In the
The ESA was challenged (unsuccessfully) on grounds that it constituted an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the president. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen v Connally, 337 F Supp 737 (DDC 1971).
... The Symmetry Principle does suggest, however, that if restricting legal fees for public
interest litigation would raise First Amendment questions, so also would the compulsory
awarding of such fees. Compare Obralik v Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 US 447 (1978), with
In re Primus, 436 US 412 (1978). It would not follow that compulsory attorneys' fees
would be unconstitutional in such circumstances, only that such fees would have to survive
First Amendment review. On the distinction between First Amendment coverage and First
Amendment protection, see note 82 above.
"' From the Meiklejohnian perspective, for example, "the point of ultimate interest is
not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers." Alexander Meiklejohn, Political
Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 26 (1965). Meiklejohn famously remarked
that "[wihat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying
shall be said." Id.
... This is because compelled expression would presumably increase the communication
reaching an audience and so serve the underlying constitutional interest in providing an
audience with information or opinion. This was the theoretical logic of Zauderer v Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 US 626 (1985), in which the Court held that compelled dis-
closures in the context of commercial speech would raise only de minimis First Amendment
concerns. Normally commercial speech, of the kind produced by the Beef Board and its
Operating Committee, is constitutionally valued because of its "informational function,"
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v Pub. Servs. Comm'n, 447 US 557, 563 (1980), rather than
because of a speaker's interests in disseminating it. See Post, Commercial Speech at 14-15
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ordinary case, however, in which First Amendment rights attach to
a speaker's decision to communicate or not to communicate, the
Symmetry Principle holds that if a state restriction on the ability
of a person to pay for speech triggers First Amendment review, so
also will a state requirement that a person pay for speech, even if
the Non-Endorsement Principle is not violated.
In Buckley v Valeo,119 for example, the Court famously held that
campaign "contribution and expenditure limitations" triggered First
Amendment review because such requirements were constitution-
ally equivalent to direct "restrictions on political communication
and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political par-
ties. ' ' 2 The Symmetry Principle would suggest that Buckley gives
us good ground to believe that compelling persons to contribute
to specific political candidates would also raise First Amendment
questions.12 1
The Court in fact drew this implication in Abood v Detroit Board
of Education,"' which held that serious First Amendment questions
were raised by a state law creating an agency shop in which all
employees were required to pay to the union that was their collective
bargaining agent a fee that was equal in amount to union dues.
Abood invoked Buckley to justify the conclusion that "[tlo compel
employees financially to support their collective-bargaining rep-
(cited in note 89). Zauderer noticed that the "informational function" of commercial speech
is not compromised when commercial speech is compelled, as distinct from restricted,
because the compulsion increases the flow of information to an audience, and hence better
serves the constitutional values at stake in commercial speech. But in United Foods the
Court appears to have held that the First Amendment protects the rights of commercial
speech speakers, rather than the rights of an audience wishing to receive the information
conveyed by commercial speech. Johanns builds on this holding. If the Court is serious
about this theoretical shift in the constitutional status of commercial speech, it will have
to alter many fundamental aspects of commercial speech jurisprudence, including the
application of overbreadth doctrine, the permissibility of prior restraints, the constitu-
tionality of required disclosures of the kind approved by Zauderer, and so on. This is a
complicated question that I discuss in Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced
Commercial Association: United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 Valparaiso U L Rev 1 (2006).
"1 424 US 1 (1976).
120 Id at 19. "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size
of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today's mass society requires the expenditure of money." Id at 19. See also Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v Members of N.Y State Crime Victims Bd., 502 US 105 (1991).
' This should be contrasted to the use of government tax dollars to subsidize elections
in a viewpoint neutral manner. Buckley, 424 US at 86-93; May v McNally, 55 P3d 768
(Ariz 2002).
122 431 US 209 (1977).
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resentative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests.
An employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide
variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive
representative."121
One of the principles underlying the Court's decision in Buckley
v Valeo was that contributing to an organization for the purpose
of spreading a political message is protected by the First Amend-
ment. Because "(m)aking a contribution. . . enables like-minded
persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common po-
litical goals," the Court reasoned that limitations upon the free-
dom to contribute "implicate fundamental First Amendment in-
terests."
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather
than prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes
works no less an infringement of their constitutional rights. For
at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an in-
dividual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free
society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his con-
science rather than coerced by the State ...
These principles prohibit a State from compelling any indi-
vidual to affirm his belief in God, or to associate with a political
party, as a condition of retaining public employment. They are
no less applicable to the case at bar, and they thus prohibit the
appellees from requiring any of the appellants to contribute to
the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition
of holding a job as a public school teacher. 124
Because Buckley had held that government restrictions of "support
of an ideological cause" raised First Amendment issues, so Abood
held that governmentally compelled support for such causes would
raise analogous First Amendment issues, even if the speech sustained
by this support could not be attributed to the contributor. The
Court affirmed a symmetry between restrictions and compulsions,
a symmetry that expressed the view that the same First Amendment
values were implicated in each. The Court subsequently reaffirmed
this symmetry in Keller v State Bar of California,2 ' which read Abood
to hold "that just as prohibitions on making contributions to or-
ganizations for political purposes implicate fundamental First
Amendment concerns, see Buckley v Valeo, 'compelled . . . contri-
23 Id at 222.
121 Id at 234-35 (citations omitted).
125 496 US 1 (1990).
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butions for political purposes work no less an infringement of...
constitutional rights."
'126
United Foods cites Abood and Keller for the broad-ranging prop-
osition that "mandated support is contrary to. . .First Amendment
principles . *.". .12' This proposition now forms the basic premise
of CSSD. In his Johanns dissent, Souter explicitly affirms this prem-
ise and attributes it to Abood and Keller.'2' Nothing that Scalia says
in his majority opinion in Johanns in any way limits or disavows
this premise, which therefore remains the law in CSSD cases that
do not involve government speech. But this premise rests on a
misreading of Abood and Keller. These decisions do not hold that
the compelled subsidization of speech always raises First Amend-
ment concerns. They instead stand for the Symmetry Principle.
They hold that if restrictions on subsidies for speech raise First
Amendment concerns, so likely will mandated support for such
speech.
The Symmetry Principle is helpful primarily because we have
well-developed (if untheorized) intuitions about when restrictions
on the funding of speech will trigger constitutional scrutiny. We
can use these intuitions to guide us in the newer and far less familiar
context of compelled subsidization of speech. Johanns illustrates the
utility of this approach. The Symmetry Principle suggests that if
government limitations on direct contributions to the state would
not raise First Amendment concerns, so also, in the absence of
special considerations like a violation of the Non-Endorsement
Principle, compelled contributions to the state would not trigger
First Amendment scrutiny. Since I very much doubt that we would
regard such limitations as triggering First Amendment scrutiny,'29
the Symmetry Principle would predict that the use of compulsory
taxes to support government speech ought not to trigger First
Amendment review.
The heuristic value of the Symmetry Principle is that it can help
us understand how the government speech exception can be inte-
'
6 Id at 9-10 (quoting Abood, 431 US at 234).
127 United States v United Foods, Inc., 533 US 405, 413 (2001).
128 Souter cites Abood and Keller as "authority for the ... proposition that, absent sub-
stantial justification, government may not force targeted individuals to pay for others to
speak." Jobanns v Livestock Mtkg. Ass'n, 125 S Ct 2055, 2069-70 (Souter, J, dissenting).
129 See, e.g., Tenn Code Ann § 64-7-110 (a)(16)(B) (2004) (prohibiting in certain cir-
cumstances private contributions to regional development authorities).
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grated into a coherent account of First Amendment jurisprudence,
which neither Scalia nor Souter is able to do. The Symmetry Prin-
ciple suggests that the explanation for the government speech ex-
ception lies in the question of why government can prohibit con-
tributions to the state without raising First Amendment concerns.
The rationale of Buckley points toward an answer. Government re-
strictions on the ability to pay others to speak for us in public debate
compromise our ability to participate in public discourse in ways
that seek to make the state democratically responsive to our own
views. 3' Such restrictions compromise First Amendment values
connected to the project of democratic legitimation. These values
are not at stake, however, when government restricts contributions
to the state.
Because the state always speaks for the community as a whole,
and never for the personal views of private citizens, the state can
never become the personal spokesperson of a citizen, no matter
how much money she donates to it. The state cannot properly
become an instrument by which private persons attempt to make
public opinion responsive to their own particular views. It follows
that restrictions on donations to the state do not compromise the
ability of persons to participate in public discourse. By calling our
attention to this conclusion, the Symmetry Principle allows us to
see that neither government restrictions on donations to the state,
nor government requirements that persons contribute to the state,
compromise First Amendment values connected to the project of
democratic legitimation, although such restrictions or compulsions
might well compromise these values in the context of contributions
to a private person.
This suggests that the fundamental constitutional question posed
by the government speech exception in Johanns is whether the Beef
Board advertisements, generically considered, should be understood
as "speaking for" the private and particular views of the beef in-
dustry, which represents the perspective of one group in the com-
munity, or instead as "speaking for" the official views of the state,
which represents the outlook of the whole community. Cases like
Glickman, United Foods, and Johanns are difficult because the industry
programs created by Congress are ambiguous mixtures of public
and private, so that it is hard to characterize the promotional ma-
" See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
Cal L Rev 2355, 2366-68 (2000).
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terial that they produce. It is unclear whether to classify this material
for constitutional purposes as expressing the private perspectives of
the cattle industry or instead as expressing the public views of the
state. The formalism of Scalia's opinion may be as satisfactory a
way as any to resolve this question, because, as he notes, if "the
government sets the overall message to be communicated and ap-
proves every word that is disseminated," '131 it is fair to conclude that
the message speaks for the official views of the government, rather
than for the particular views of private industry.13 2
Neither Scalia nor Souter can accept this explanation of the gov-
ernment speech exception, however, because each postulates that
the fundamental First Amendment interest at issue in CSSD is
autonomy, rather than participation in public debate.'33 The diffi-
culty with regarding autonomy as a fundamental First Amendment
interest is that it is omnipresent; every restriction and compulsion
will to some degree compromise autonomy. It is precisely for this
reason that autonomy is not usefully regarded as a foundational
First Amendment interest.134 Autonomy cannot explain why First
31Johanns, 125 S Ct at 2063. See note 41 above.
132 Some lower courts have instead focused on the question of whether the speech pro-
duced by these ambiguous organizations is in fact unduly influenced by private perspectives.
See note 38 above. Although this question is theoretically justified, it is not clear that it
is judicially administrable. It is certainly not unreasonable for the Court to hold that it is
not.
"' See notes 36, 40, and 54 above.
" There is a slight indication that Souter may have in mind the constitutional value
of protecting conscience, rather than protecting autonomy. Souter begins his dissent by
noting:
In 1779 Jefferson wrote that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money
for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." 5
The Founders' Constitution, § 37, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, p.
77 (1987), codified in 1786 at Va. Code Ann. § 57-1 (Lexis 2003). Although he
was not thinking about compelled advertising of farm produce, we echoed Jef-
ferson's view four years ago in United Foods, where we said that "First Amendment
values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a
discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it
favors ...."533 US at 411.
Johanns, 125 S Ct at 2069 (SouterJ, dissenting). Jefferson's observation, whichis frequently
cited in the context of compelled speech cases, concerned the issue of the use of government
tax revenue to support an established church. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v Shewry, 384 F3d
1126, 1140-41 (9th Cir 2004). There is a tradition in our law and our history that such
taxation would compromise conscience. See Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83 (1968); Noah Feld-
man, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 NYU L Rev 346, 404 (2002).
Souter may have meant, therefore, that compelled subsidization of government speech
potentially violates the conscience of taxpayers, in the same way that the use of taxes to
support an established church is understood to violate the conscience of taxpayers. There
[2005
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Amendment interests are sometimes triggered and sometimes
not. 135
To understand the actual shape of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, we must postulate a constitutional interest that is implicated
in some circumstances, but not in all circumstances. If the circum-
stances in which an interest is involved happen to correspond to
the actual pattern of First Amendment cases, we have a good can-
didate for the First Amendment interest that is in fact driving ju-
dicial decision making. The interest of autonomy, which would be
compromised by compulsory taxation as well as by the compelled
payment of attorneys' fees at issue in Newdow, does not well explain
the configuration of existing or desirable First Amendment juris-
prudence. The interest of participation in public debate, by contrast,
which is involved neither in compelled contributions to the state
nor in compelled contributions to a private lawyer in a private
case,136 does have considerable explanatory power in explaining the
government speech exception, as well as the contours of CSSD
generally.
III. CONCLUSION
Johanns is a welcome development, but it leaves in place the
central premise of CSSD, which is that every compelled subsidi-
zation of objectionable speech requires First Amendment review.
This premise derives from a misreading of Abood and Keller, and it
gives clear doctrinal expression to the idea, advanced by both Scalia
and Souter, that autonomy is a fundamental First Amendment in-
terest which is always at stake whenever the state forces persons to
pay for the speech of others. This idea is demonstrably false unless
the Court plans to constitutionalize many common legal require-
ments that no one presently regards as raising First Amendment
issues. 131
are many difficulties with this line of thought, however. It is odd to speak of violations
of conscience in the context of nonideological speech like beef advertisements. And whereas
the connection between conscience and religion is well explored, the relationship between
conscience and speech is not. Most fundamentally, conscience, like autonomy, would seem
to prove too much, because it is potentially indiscriminate. Newdow would seem to have
a claim of conscience that is at least equal in force to those of the beef producers in
Jobanns.
'sSee Post, 88 Cal L Rev at 2372 (cited in note 129).
'"See note 115 above.
'3 See text at notes 78-107.
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So long as the central premise of CSSD remains unrevised, how-
ever, the holding of Johanns can serve as nothing more than a kind
of force majeur necessary to foreclose potentially embarrassing ap-
plications of the compelled subsidization of speech doctrine. The
lesson of Newdow is that in the future the Court will be required
to announce other equally ad hoc decisions. The only hope of
avoiding a string of precedents as self-evidently ragged as the Glick-
man-United Foods-Johanns trilogy is to repudiate the premise of
CSSD and to rethink the fundamental question of when the com-
pelled subsidization of speech does and does not raise First Amend-
ment issues. This may in turn require reconceptualizing the nature
of the fundamental interests which the First Amendment should be
interpreted to protect in the context of compulsions to speak. This
essay is meant to be a first small step in that direction.
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